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Summary
When given the opportunity, liars will embed their lies into otherwise truthful state-
ments. In what way this embedding affects the quality of lies, however, remains
largely unknown. This study investigated whether lies that are embedded into truth-
ful stories are richer in detail and contain higher quality details compared to lies that
are part of entirely fabricated statements. Participants (N = 111) were asked to pro-
vide a statement that was either entirely truthful, entirely fabricated, or had the fabri-
cated element of interest embedded into an otherwise truthful story. Results
indicated that lies embedded in a fabricated statement are not qualitatively different
from lies embedded in an otherwise truthful statement. Supporting Bayes factors
provided moderate to strong evidence for this conclusion. Accordingly, verbal credi-
bility assessment tools based on the verbal content measured in this study may be
robust against the embedding of lies.
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Whereas people typically report to rely on nonverbal behaviour to
detect deception (Vrij, 2008), the accuracy of credibility assessments
actually improves when judges rely only on the verbal content of a
statement (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Moreover, good lie detectors
report a higher reliance on verbal cues when making credibility judg-
ments, while poor lie detectors tend to rely primarily on nonverbal
cues (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004). Specifically, the most consistent find-
ing in the verbal deception literature is that truthful statements con-
tain more details than deceptive ones (e.g., Amado, Arce, Fariña, &
Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Luke, 2019; Oberlander et al.,
2016). A recent meta-analysis estimated this effect at d = 0.55
(Amado et al., 2016), while additional meta-analytical findings support
the usefulness of temporal, visual, and auditory details for differentiat-
ing truthful from false accounts (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Her-
rero, 2005).
In studies investigating the effect of deception on the content of
statements, participants are typically instructed to report a truthful
account, or to fabricate one. Real-life deceptive statements will, how-
ever, rarely be complete fabrications, as liars prefer to embed their lies
into otherwise truthful statements (e.g., Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013;
Nahari, 2018a; Nahari & Vrij, 2015; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter,
2010). Yet, it remains unknown how embedded lies are influenced by
surrounding truthful information. Reason to believe that the embed-
ding of lies affects their quality stems from research on beliefs about
cues to deception and liars' strategies. This research suggests that lay-
people and legal professionals alike believe that inconsistency is
symptomatic of deception (Blair, Reimer, & Levine, 2018; Strömwall &
Granhag, 2003; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Accord-
ingly, one of the main concerns of liars—and one of their most fre-
quently reported strategies—is to maintain consistency (Deeb et al.,
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2017; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). Specifically,
Deeb et al. (2017) instructed liars to provide a statement containing a
mix of a deceptive event and a truthful event. When asked about their
strategies for appearing credible, 45% of liars mentioned maintaining
consistency, and many liars reported to have maintained consistency
by strategically lowering their “baseline consistency” by including
fewer repetitions in specific portions of the interview.
If participants would successfully maintain consistency when
embedding their lies into an otherwise truthful statement, their lies
could become more richly detailed when surrounded by truthful infor-
mation. Indeed, recent research compared how interviewees strategi-
cally regulate the information they provide when their accounts
contain one truthful and one deceptive component and found that lies
became more richly detailed when preceded or followed by truthful
information compared to when preceded or followed by other lies
(Verigin, Meijer, Vrij, & Zauzig, 2019). The present study aimed to
extend these findings by examining the extent to which the embed-
ding of lies into otherwise truthful stories affects the quality of infor-
mation. In line with previous research (e.g., Amado et al., 2016;
DePaulo et al., 2003; Luke, 2019; Masip et al., 2005), we predicted
that completely truthful statements would be richer in detail compared
to completely fabricated statements (Hypothesis 1). Based on our con-
sistency assumption, we also predicted that lies embedded into an oth-
erwise truthful statement would be richer in details than lies embedded
into an entirely fabricated statement (Hypothesis 2).
Besides the differences in detail richness, we also investigated
whether the consistency hypothesis extends to a number of other
content cues that have been shown diagnostic of deception (see
Table 1). As secondary cues, we first examined the amount of verifi-
able information. This cue stems from the Verifiability Approach (VA;
Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b), which works on the assumption that
liars, on the one hand, are inclined to provide detailed statements to
be perceived as cooperative and credible, but, on the other hand,
want to minimize the chances that investigators can falsify their state-
ment (Masip & Herrero, 2013; Nahari et al., 2014a). A strategy that
meets these aims is to provide information that cannot be verified.
Second, we examined liars' tendency to report fewer complications—
occurrences that make a situation more difficult than necessary, often
characterized by disrupted activity or failing efforts (e.g., missing the
bus; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018)—
compared to truth tellers. This makes sense given liars' preference for
simple stories (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). We also investi-
gated common knowledge details (i.e., strongly invoked stereotypical
information about events; Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al., 2018). Whereas
truth tellers have personal, unique experiences of an event (DePaulo,
Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), liars typically lack such
information and their reports tend to be characterized by more gen-
eral, impersonal knowledge (Sporer, 2016). Another cue relates to
self-handicapping strategies (i.e., implicit or explicit justifications as to
why someone is unable to provide certain information; Vrij, Leal,
Mann, et al., 2018). Although liars prefer to keep their stories simple,
they also realize that admitting a lack of knowledge and/or memory
may generate suspicion from investigators (Ruby & Brigham, 1998).
Liars, then, are inclined to provide justifications for their inability to
provide certain information.
Lastly, we explored the clarity and plausibility of statements. Clar-
ity, or vividness, refers to the extent to which a statement is clear,
sharp, and vivid (instead of dim and vague; e.g., Sporer, 2004). How
plausible a statement is refers to whether the story is probable, realis-
tic, and makes sense. Both critera derive from the reality monitoring
method of credibility assessment (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981), which
reasons that truthful accounts represent experienced memories and
are likely to be, for example, more clear and plausible compared to
lies, which are formed from imagination. There is previous empirical
support regarding these critera (DePaulo et al., 2003; Leal et al., 2015;
Sporer & Küpper, 1995; Zhou et al., 2004).
Altogether, our secondary hypotheses were that completely truth-
ful statements would be characterized by more verifiable details, a
higher proportion of complications, and higher ratings of statement
clarity and plausibility compared to completely fabricated statements
(Hypothesis 3), and that lies embedded into an otherwise truthful state-
ment would be characterized by these higher quality details moreso
TABLE 1 Previous research findings regarding content cues of liars' and truth tellers' statements
Veracity cue Direction of support Evidence base
Verifiability of details More prevalent in truthful statements Nahari, 2018b; Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, & Ludwig,
2016; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b.
Complications More prevalent in truthful statements Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal,
Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij et al., 2018.
Common knowledge details More prevalent in deceptive statements Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij et al.,
2017.
Self-handicapping strategies More prevalent in deceptive statements Vrij et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al., 2018;
Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij, Leal,
Mann, et al., 2018.
Statement clarity More prevalent in truthful statements Johnson & Raye, 1981; Sporer & Küpper, 1995.
Statement plausibility More prevalent in truthful statements DePaulo et al., 2003; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink,
Vernham, & Fisher, 2015; Zhou, Burgoon,
Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004.
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than lies embedded into an entirely fabricated statement (Hypothesis 4;
see Table 1).
1 | METHOD
1.1 | Participants
The sample consisted of 111 undergraduate students, graduate stu-
dents, and staff members, who were all naïve to forensic psychology
(92 females; 19 males; Mage = 21.91 years; SDage = 4.25). An apriori
power analysis indicated that this number of participants was required
to achieve an 80% likelihood of detecting a true difference given a
medium effect size. All subjects participated in exchange for course
credit or a £5 voucher and the opportunity to win a £50 raffle. Eligible
participants were native-English speakers, aged 18 years or older. The
study was approved by the standing ethical committee and was
preregistered and approved via the Open Science Framework (OSF):
http://j.mp/2D60QWu.
1.2 | Procedure
Upon arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants
completed a Pre-Interview Questionnaire followed by a demographic
form measuring their age, sex, ethnicity, education, and native-language.
Participants then received a letter instructing them to imagine that they
had been called into a police interview as a suspect in a home invasion
investigation, and that they must provide an alibi for their whereabouts
during the day of the crime. Three conditions were created by providing
participants with additional instructions. First, truth tellers were told that
they were innocent, and their task was to convince the interviewer of
their innocence by providing a completely truthful alibi. In addition, two
lie conditions were created. Liars were told to imagine they were guilty
of the hypothetical crime in question, and that they must lie about their
whereabouts during the time of the home invasion, that took place
between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. Embedded liars were instructed to
embed the critical 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period in an otherwise truthful
account, whereas in the complete lie condition, liars were asked to fabri-
cate the entire account (see Supporting Information for the instructions).
All participants were told it was important to be convincing because it
would earn them a chance to win a £50 voucher and it would prevent
them from having to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a writ-
ten account. After receiving these instructions, participants were given
up to ten minutes alone to prepare.
The assignment to either the truthful, embedded lie, or complete lie
condition was done in a pseudo-random manner. The first five of every
fifteen participants were assigned to the truth teller condition, whereas
the remaining participants (e.g., participants 6 to 15, 21 to 30, etcetera)
were assigned to either the embedded lie or complete lie conditions. This
was done so we could match the content of the critical period in the two
lie conditions to that in the truth teller condition. Specifically, the alibi
activity that participants were instructed to lie about was generated
based on the truth tellers' responses to the Pre-Interview Questionnaire
that asked them to briefly describe, in approximately one sentence, their
activities between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on the previous three days.
The first author selected the activity that had the most unique, contex-
tual detail, and this selected activity was used for all three conditions,
while making sure the assigned alibi activity differed from any of the liars'
reported events. This pseudo-randomized design allowed us to experi-
mentally control the type of activity reported and length of time between
the experience and reporting (i.e., one, two or three days) across partici-
pants, thereby reducing heterogeneity across statements.
Next, a second researcher (blind to participants' conditions) began
the interview by stating that her goal was to obtain as much informa-
tion as possible, and to determine how credible the participant's
account was. The interviewer instructed the participant to report as
many details as possible, even if she/he did not think they were
important. Each interview followed a structured format (see
Supporting Information) and was video-recorded. The interview began
with the elicitation of a free narrative of the participants' activities
from morning to evening on the day in question. The researcher then
asked several questions, such as “What else can you tell me about that
day?”, “Did anything unexpected happen or perhaps something that
did not go as planned?” Interviewees were also asked to report their
activities during the 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period specifically and
were given the opportunity to provide any forgotten or missing infor-
mation at the end of the interview.
Following the interview, participants were informed that the
experimental portion of the study had ended, that their answers to the
following questionnaire would not influence how their statement
would be assessed, and that they should answer the next questions
honestly. Participants then completed the Post-Interview question-
naire, where they were asked to rate several items on 5-point Likert
scales (1 – strongly agree to 5 – strongly disagree): (i) The instructions
clearly explained what I needed to do, (ii) I had enough time to prepare
for the interview, (iii) I was motivated to convince the interviewer that I
was innocent, (iv) I was successful in convincing the interviewer that I
was innocent, (v) I prepared my statements strategically, (vi) The inter-
viewer was friendly. Next, participants evaluated the truthfulness of
both the critical and general components of their alibi using a 10-point
scale (1 – not at all truthful to 10 – completely truthful). Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed, and the experiment was concluded. None of the
participants were asked to stay longer and all participants were included
in the raffle. Participation in the study took approximately 1 hour.
1.2.1 | Coding
Statements were assessed for the presence of spatial information
(e.g., “Sitting in the row behind my friend”), temporal information
(e.g., “It was 6:00 p.m.”), and perceptual information (e.g., “I saw him
sitting at the bar”; richness of detail), the verifiability of detail (e.g., a
receipt of purchase), the presence of complications (e.g., missing the
bus), common knowledge details (e.g., “We went to pick up groceries at
the store”), and self-handicapping strategies (e.g., “I can't tell you
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anything else because my friend did all of the planning”), and the clar-
ity and plausibility of the statement (statement quality). The exact
description of the verbal content coding can be found in the
Supporting Information. Two scores were created for each dependent
measure; the first was the sum of all occurrences in the entire state-
ment, the second constituted the sum within the time period from
1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. To establish reliability, the main coder and a
second coder evaluated a randomly selected 20% of the statements.
Using the two-way random effects model measuring consistency (see
Koo & Li, 2016), interrater reliability was high for spatial information
(Single Measures, Intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = .79), tempo-
ral information (ICC = .93), and perceptual information (ICC = .78). The
combined richness of detail variable thus had excellent reliability
(ICC = .97), as did the verifiable details variable (ICC = .91). The reliabil-
ity for coding the presence of complications, common knowledge
details, and self-handicapping strategies was also adequate (ICC's = .60,
.51, and .71, respectively). The ICC's were high for statement clarity
(.90) and adequate for statement plausibility (.51), leading to a high
reliability score for the combined statement quality variable (ICC = .87).
After confirming the reliability between the two coders, the main
coder completed the remaining sample of participants' statements. In
the analyses, we used only the scores of the main coder.
1.3 | Deviations from preregistration
The analyses reported here deviate from the preregistration in several
ways. All deviations were decided upon prior to analyzing the data. First,
we preregistered two separate analyses, one based on “quantity of
details” (e.g., particular information regarding places, times, persons,
objects, and events) and one based on “the richness of detail”. Instead,
we limit our analysis to “richness of detail,” a combination of all spatial,
temporal, and perceptual information. Second, we preregistered predic-
tions based on a measure combining the frequency of complications,
self-handicapping strategies, and common-knowledge details. Instead,
we coded the frequency of each cue separately and calculated the pro-
portion of complications score (complications/ [complications + common
knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies]). This is in line with
previous literature (see, for example, Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018)
and has theoretical advantages given that it is a within-subjects compari-
son that is also sensitive to the different verbal strategies used by liars
and truth tellers. Finally, we specified a priori hypotheses regarding par-
ticipants' self-reported strategies. We report these analyses in the
Supporting Information to keep the manuscript within reasonable length.
2 | RESULTS
2.1 | Motivation, preparation, & self-perceived
success
No significant differences between the three veracity conditions
appeared for motivation, the clarity of instructions, preparation time,
strategic preparation, and interviewer friendliness (see Supporting
Information for exact analyses). Significant differences between the
veracity conditions appeared for reported success in convincing the
interviewer that they were innocent, F(2, 108) = 4.74, p = .011,
ηP2 = .081. Truth tellers reported being the most successful (M = 4.14,
SD = 0.82), followed by liars in the embedded lie condition (M = 3.78,
SD = 0.82), and lastly liars in the complete lie condition (M = 3.51,
SD = 0.96). Posthoc comparisons using the Bonferroni procedure indi-
cated that the mean difference in self-perceived success was only sta-
tistically significant between the truth tellers and liars in the complete
lie condition (p = .008).
2.2 | Truthfulness measures
We asked participants to rate, on a scale of one to ten (one being not
at all truthful and ten being completely truthful) how truthful the
1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. component of their alibi statement was. Signifi-
cant differences emerged between the conditions, F(2, 108) = 136.21,
p < .001, ηP2 = .716. Truth tellers reported that the critical component
of their alibi was almost completely truthful (M = 9.59, SD = 0.90),
whereas liars in the complete lie (M = 2.46, SD = 2.57) and embedded
lie (M = 2.62, SD = 2.48) conditions indicated that only a small portion
of their critical alibi component was truthful. Posthoc comparisons
showed that the mean difference in reported truthfulness was statisti-
cally significant only between the truth tellers and liars in the com-
plete lie condition (p < .001) and between the truth tellers and liars in
the embedded lie condition (p < .001). Thus, the self-reported truth-
fulness of the critical component of interviewees' alibi statements
conformed to the instructions they received across conditions.
Similarly, we asked participants to rate, on the same ten-point
scale, how truthful their general alibi statement was, excluding the
period from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Significant differences emerged
between the conditions, F(2, 108) = 75.82, p < .001, ηP2 = .584. Truth
tellers reported that the majority of their general alibi was truthful
(M = 9.32, SD = 0.88). Liars in the complete lie condition reported that
a portion of their general alibi was truthful (M = 3.32, SD = 2.76),
whereas liars in the embedded lie condition reported that the majority
of their general alibi was truthful (M = 7.92, SD = 2.45). Posthoc com-
parisons indicated that the mean difference in reported truthfulness
was significant between truth tellers and liars in the embedded lie
condition (p = .002), between truth tellers and liars in the complete lie
condition (p < .001) and between liars in the embedded lie and liars in
the complete lie conditions (p < .001). As above, the self-reported
truthfulness of the general component of interviewees' alibi state-
ments mostly corresponded to the instructions they received across
conditions.
2.3 | Statement characteristics
Our primary analyses focused on examining the characteristics
between entirely truthful statements versus entirely fabricated
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statements, and between the deceptive 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period
embedded in lies and embedded in truths. Additionally, we conducted
two exploratory analyses.1 We compared the characteristics of the
deceptive 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period embedded in truths with the
truthful 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period also embedded into truths, and
we compared the truthful parts of the statement flanking the decep-
tive 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period to the truthful parts of the state-
ment flanking the truthful 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period.
2.3.1 | Confirmatory hypothesis testing
Statement characteristics were analyzed using a series of univariate
between-subjects ANOVAs. Additionally, the data were examined by
calculating a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales (i.e., r scale
fixed effects at 0.5), using JASP software. We report the Bayesian fac-
tors (BF; see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) in line
with the guidelines by Jarosz and Wiley (2014), adjusted from Jeffreys
(1961). The approximate evidence categories are as follows: Positive
values between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for the alternate or
null hypothesis, between 3 and 10 indicate substantial evidence,
between 10 and 20 constitutes strong or very strong evidence, and
scores above 20 are considered very strong or decisive evidence. For
ease of interpretation, BF10 indicates the Bayes factor as evidence in
favor of the alternative hypothesis, whereas BF01 indicates the Bayes
factor as evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
2.3.2 | Richness of detail
We first compared the completely truthful to the completely fabri-
cated statements on the richness of details (i.e., amount of spatial,
temporal, and perceptual information combined) by conducting a uni-
variate between-subjects ANOVA. As predicted, truthful statements
(M = 56.46, SD = 27.85) scored higher on richness of details than fab-
ricated statements (M = 41.38, SD = 15.66), F(1, 72) = 8.24, p = .005,
ηP2 = .103, BF10 = 7.51, lending support to Hypothesis 1.
Next, we tested Hypothesis 2 by conducting a second univariate
between-subjects ANOVA to compare the detail richness of the
1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period between the embedded lie and com-
plete lie conditions. We did not observe a significant effect for the
richness of detail, F(1, 72) = .21, p = .648, ηP2 = .003, BF01 = 3.80,
meaning that lies embedded into otherwise truthful statements were
not significantly richer in detail than lies embedded into entirely fabri-
cated statements. As such, we did not find support for Hypothesis 2.
2.3.3 | Secondary content cues
To evaluate Hypothesis 3, we conducted a series of univariate
between-subjects ANOVAs to compare the completely truthful to the
completely fabricated statements on (a) the amount of verifiable
details, (b) the number of complications, common knowledge details,
and self-handicapping strategies, (c) the total proportion of complica-
tions (i.e., complications/[complications + common knowledge details
+ self-handicapping strategies]), and (d) the quality of statements
(i.e., the clarity/plausibility). Truthful statements (M = .30, SD = .62)
contained significantly fewer self-handicapping strategies than fabri-
cated statements (M = .65, SD = .86), F(1, 72) = 4.09, p = .047,
ηP2 = .054, but the BF10 of 1.34 was not very diagnostic. We did not
observe significant effects of Veracity on the remaining dependent
variables: The amount of verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 1.76, p = .189,
ηP2 = .024, BF01 = 1.96; the number of complications, F(1, 72) = 1.54
p = .219, ηP2 = .021, BF01 = 2.15; the number of common knowledge
details, F(1, 72) = 2.88, p = .094, ηP2 = .038, BF01 = 1.22; the propor-
tion of complications, F(1, 72) = 2.65, p = .108, ηP2 = .036, BF01 = 1.34;
the quality of statements, F(1, 72) = .70, p = .407, ηP2 = .010,
BF01 = 3.08. The exact values can be found in Table 2. Hence, we
received only partial support for Hypothesis 3, that completely truth-
ful statements would contain more high-quality content cues com-
pared to fabricated accounts.
We tested Hypothesis 4 by conducting a second series of univari-
ate between-subjects ANOVAs to compare the 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.
period between the Embedded lie and Complete lie conditions on the
same secondary content cues. Only one significant difference
emerged: Liars in the complete lie condition provided some self-
handicapping strategies (M = .11, SD = .32) during the critical portion
of the alibi, whereas those in the embedded lie condition did not pro-
vide any, F(1, 72) = 4.36, p = .040, ηP2 = .057, BF10 = 1.53. We did not
observe a significant effect for the remaining variables: The amount of
verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 1.26, p = .265, ηP2 = .017, BF01 = 2.42; the
number of complications, F(1, 72) = 1.13, p = .292, ηP2 = .015,
BF01 = 2.57; the number of common knowledge details, F
(1, 72) = 3.22, p = .077, ηP2 = .043, BF01 = 1.05; the proportion of
complications, F(1, 72) = 0.77, p = .382, ηP2 = .011, BF01 = 2.98; the
quality of statements, F(1, 72) = .17, p = .685, ηP2 = .002, BF01 = 3.88.
See Table 2 for the exact values. Thus, our analysis of the secondary
content cues revealed no differences between lies embedded in truths
and lies embedded in lies, with Bayes Factors demonstrating weak to
substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. The only excep-
tion was self-handicapping strategies.
2.3.4 | Exploratory testing
Having found that lies embedded in otherwise truthful statements did
not differ from lies embedded in an otherwise deceptive statement,
we were also interested to what extent these embedded lies could be
distinguished from truths. We therefore conducted an exploratory
analysis of the 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. period between the embedded
lie condition (lie embedded into a truthful statement) and the truth
teller condition (truth also embedded into a truthful statement). The
embedded truths (M = 21.22, SD = 12.33) were significantly richer in
detail than the embedded lies (M = 15.22, SD = 9.65), F(1, 72) = 5.43,
p = .023, ηP2 = .070, BF10 = 2.39. Embedded truths (M = 2.95,
SD = 1.10) were also rated as having higher statement quality than
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TABLE 2 Exact values of dependent measure scores in the critical and general statement components as a function of veracity condition
Dependent variable Veracity condition Statement component Mean value Confidence intervals (95% CI)
Richness of detail*+ Truth teller*+ 1:00–3:00 p.m.* 21.22 [17.10, 25.33]
General statement+ 56.46 [47.17, 65.75]
Embedded liar* 1:00–3:00 p.m.* 15.22 [12.00, 18.43]
General statement 51.68 [43.68, 59.67]
Complete liar+ 1:00–3:00 p.m. 14.24 [11.39, 17.09]
General statement+ 41.38 [36.16, 46.60]
Verifiability of details Truth teller 1:00–3:00 p.m. 3.14 [2.29, 3.98]
General statement 9.57 [7.75, 11.38]
Embedded liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 2.14 [1.51, 2.76]
General statement 8.14 [6.68, 9.60]
Complete liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 2.70 [1.89, 3.52]
General statement 8.00 [6.43, 9.57]
Complications Truth teller 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.22 [0.04, 0.39]
General statement 0.89 [0.41, 1.37]
Embedded liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.16 [0.04, 0.29]
General statement 1.08 [0.26, 1.90]
Complete liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.08 [−0.01, 0.17]
General statement 0.54 [0.23, 0.85]
Common knowledge details Truth teller 1:00–3:00 p.m. 1.41 [0.95, 1.86]
General statement 6.14 [4.91, 7.36]
Embedded liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 2.00 [1.49, 2.51]
General statement 7.76 [6.37, 9.14]
Complete liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 1.43 [1.04, 1.82]
General statement 7.57 [6.37, 8.77]
Self-handicapping strategies+ Truth teller+ 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.05 [−0.02, 0.13]
General statement+ 0.30 [0.09, 0.50]
Embedded liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
General statement 0.43 [0.22, 0.65]
Complete liar+ 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.11 [0.00, 0.21]
General statement+ 0.65 [0.36, 0.93]
Proportion of complications Truth teller 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.13 [0.02, 0.23]
General statement 0.15 [0.06, 0.24]
Embedded liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.07 [0.00, 0.13]
General statement 0.13 [0.04, 0.21]
Complete liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 0.03 [−0.01, 0.07]
General statement 0.07 [0.02, 0.11]
Statement quality* Truth teller* 1:00–3:00 p.m.* 2.95 [2.58, 3.31]
General statement 2.73 [2.37, 3.09]
Embedded liar* 1:00–3:00 p.m.* 2.35 [1.93, 2.77]
General statement 2.35 [2.00, 2.70]
Complete liar 1:00–3:00 p.m. 2.46 [2.12, 2.80]
General statement 2.54 [2.25, 2.83]
Note: The asterisks (*) indicate the dependent variables with statistically significant differences for the 1:00 to 3:00 p.m. critical component and where
these differences occurred. The plus signs (+) indicate the dependent variables with statistically significant differences for the general component and
where these differences occurred.
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embedded lies (M = 2.35, SD = 1.25), F(1, 72) = 4.69, p = .034,
ηP2 = .061, BF10 = 1.76. We did not find significant differences for the
remaining variables: The amount of verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 3.74,
p = .057, ηP2 = .049, BF01 = 0.85; the number of complications, F
(1, 72) = 0.25, p = .616, ηP2 = .004, BF01 = 3.73; the number of com-
mon knowledge details, F(1, 72) = 3.12, p = .082, ηP2 = .042,
BF01 = 1.10; the number of self-handicapping strategies, F
(1, 72) = 2.06, p = .156, ηP2 = .028, BF01 = 1.72; the total proportion
of complications, F(1, 72) = 1.00, p = .321, ηP2 = .014, BF01 = 2.71.
Exact values can be found in Table 2. These results indicate that lies
embedded into otherwise truthful accounts can be differentiated from
truths based on detail richness and statement quality, although the
Bayes factors indicate the evidence for this is weak at best.
We preregistered our hypothesis that lies embedded in truths
would be richer in detail than lies incorporated into fully fabricated
accounts. It is, however, also possible that embedded lies affected the
flanking truthful component. To investigate this, we conducted a
series of independent samples t-tests on the dependent measures
between the truthful portions flanking the embedded lies, and the
same components flanking the truths. Embedded liars (M = 36.46,
SD = 17.91) and truth tellers (M = 35.24, SD = 20.74) provided similar
richness of detail in the truthful components of their statements, t
(72) = −.27, p = .788, d = −.06, BF01 = 4.03. Similarly, we did not find
significant differences for the remaining variables: The amount of veri-
fiable details, t(72) = .34, p = .735, d = .08, BF01 = 3.96; the number of
complications, t(72) = −.47, p = .639, d = −.11, BF01 = 3.78; the num-
ber of self-handicapping strategies, t(72) = −1.15, p = .253, d = −.27,
BF01 = 2.35; the number of common knowledge details, t(72) = −1.40,
p = .165, d = −.33, BF01 = 1.79. These results indicate that the truthful
components of statements were consistently rich in detail and
included similar quality of detail, regardless of whether the statement
was entirely truthful or contained an embedded lie.
3 | DISCUSSION
In line with previous research (e.g., Amado et al., 2016; Luke, 2019), we
found that entirely truthful statements were richer in detail compared
to entirely fabricated statements (Hypothesis 1). In contrast to previous
findings by Verigin et al. (2019), we did not find evidence that lies
embedded into truthful stories were more richly detailed than lies
embedded into completely fabricated stories (Hypothesis 2). Regarding
our secondary dependent measures, self-handicapping strategies
emerged as the only (weakly) diagnostic cue to differentiate entirely
truthful statements from entirely fabricated statements (Hypothesis 3),
and embedded lies from complete lies (Hypothesis 4).
This experiment investigated how the verbal content of lies was
affected by embedding them into otherwise truthful statements. Our
hypotheses, that lies embedded in truthful information would be
richer in details (Hypothesis 2) and other high-quality details
(Hypothesis 4) than lies that are part of completely fabricated state-
ments, were not supported. Consequently, lies embedded in other-
wise truthful statements and lies embedded in deceptive statements
could be distinguished from truths equally well. Our finding that lies
embedded in truthful statements can be differentiated from truths
that are part of fully truthful accounts is comparable to that of Gnisci,
Caso, and Vrij (2010). It is encouraging that in both studies, even
when liars incorporate truthful, previously experienced information
into their fabrications, differences still exist between these deceptive
and truthful elements. This has important implications for practice, as
it means that tools used in in the field such as Criteria-Based Content
Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) may be robust to the influ-
ence of embedded lies.
Compared to being entirely truthful or entirely deceptive, telling a
mixture of truths and lies could have resulted in reporting more details
about the deceptive parts of their statement, fewer details about the
truthful parts of their statement, or a combination of both. The lack of
difference between the two types of lies suggests that embedded liars
did not maintain consistency between the truthful and fabricated
components of their statements. A potential explanation could be
that, without specific knowledge of the criteria indicative of truthful-
ness, it would be difficult for liars to produce a fabricated element that
is comparable in detail and quality to the truthful component. The
only observable difference between the two types of lies was with
regard to the presence of self-handicapping strategies; however,
the observed significance can be explained by a floor effect meaning
this result should be interpreted with caution. Additionally, we found
that interviewees provided similar richness and quality of detail in the
truthful components of their accounts, regardless of whether this
component was flanked by truthful or deceptive information. This
provides interesting insight into the high quality of statements that
could potentially be provided by embedded liars.
When comparing the entire statement, completely truthful
accounts differed from fully fabricated accounts, though only with
regard to our primary cue richness of detail (Hypothesis 1) and self-
handicapping strategies (Hypothesis 3). Importantly, richness of detail
is the most empirically supported cue from the literature and there-
fore contributes strong insights to our pattern of results. Regarding
our secondary cues, we failed to replicate previous findings that
truthful accounts contain more verifiable details than deceptive
ones. A potential explanation for the discrepancy between our find-
ings and the general verifiability literature is that we did not employ
the entire VA procedure (see also Bogaard, Meijer, & Van der Plas,
2019; Nahari et al., 2014b). Research suggests that the VA
approach is most effective when, prior to their interview, inter-
viewees are requested to include details that the investigator can
check—what is known as the information protocol (Harvey et al.,
2016; Nahari et al., 2014b). We opted not to use this protocol
because this instruction may have affected liars' and truth tellers'
responses and influenced the other dependent measures of our
experiment.
We also did not find the proportion of complications to be a diag-
nostic cue to veracity in any of the three comparisons. This may have
been due to floor effects in our sample (truthful interviewees in our
study reported on average, less than one complication, relative to
other studies in which truthful reports typically produce an average of
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ten or more complications; e.g., Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij,
Leal, Mann, et al., 2018). Regarding common knowledge details, it has
been suggested that truthful interviewees sound scripted in their
reports if they underestimate the amount and type of detailed infor-
mation they are required to report (Vrij, 2018). A potential reason
for not observing significant differences with regard to the propor-
tion of complications was due to the reduced time period, as well as
the events, that participants were reporting in their alibi statement.
If participants had reported longer, more dynamic statements, per-
haps after exposure to a model statement (e.g., Leal et al., 2015),
then the proportion of complications may have been a more
effective cue.
We also did not observe differences regarding the statement
quality between completely truthful statements and completely fab-
ricated statements when comparing the entire accounts, yet we did
replicate this effect when comparing only the embedded 1:00 p.m.
to 3:00 p.m. component of the alibis. Reporting truthfully involves
retrieving and reconstructing one's memory, whereas constructing a
lie involves fabricating a story based on scripted knowledge about
comparable situations and events (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Consid-
ering that liars in our study admitted having included some truthful
information in their statements, it is possible that this allowed their
overall statements to come across equally as clear and plausible as
honest interviewees.
3.1 | Limitations and future research
The goal of our study was to examine embedded lies and we did so
by isolating a critical statement of interest, while manipulating the
veracity of the surrounding components. However, the period for
which the liars came up with spanned 2 hours. In real life, liars may
stay as close to the truth as possible, only fabricating or omitting a
few key, incriminating details. Future research could extend our par-
adigm to accommodate for the dispersion of truths and lies through-
out a statement and particularly how interviewees' verbal content
may be inconsistent when they lie and tell the truth in a single
account.
A second limitation is that the self-reported truthfulness rat-
ings revealed that liars instructed to fabricate their entire account
reported still including some truthful information, and the embed-
ded liars reported that their general statement was mostly truthful,
but still included some lies. This may be methodologically some-
what awkward but it does reflect what liars typically do: Providing
statements that contain a mixture of truths and lies (Leins et al.,
2013; Leins, Zimmerman, & Polander, 2017). As such, the finding is
high in ecological validity. We did, however, check by self-report
that liars did not engage in the assigned activity on the day in
question nor on any adjacent days. This does not, of course,
exclude the possibility that they engaged in the activity on an ear-
lier occasion, meaning they could still have drawn from this truth-
ful experience, simply displacing it in time. Future research that
manipulates the type of lie that interviewees provide, such that it
cannot be readily drawn from a potential previous experience, may
produce a different pattern of results. Another methodological
adjustment that may yield different findings would be allowing
participants to choose the topic of their report, rather than con-
straining their reports to an activity scripted by the experimenter.
This would more appropriately reflect the circumstances of real-
world liars, who are typically not forced to report any particular
event (e.g., Leins et al., 2013).
Another important consideration relates to ground truth. Our
study involved interviewees reporting self-generated stories within a
naturalistic alibi scenario. We established partial ground truth via our
truthfulness measures, which indicated that participants largely con-
formed to the experimental instructions. We were unable to further
corroborate participants' accounts, however. Although the current
experiment ensured that participants were emotionally engaged with
the experimental process and similar paradigms have been used
extensively by deception researchers (e.g., Elntib, Wagstaff, &
Wheatcroft, 2015; Masip et al., 2005; Sporer & Sharman, 2006),
future research would benefit from attempting to establish ground
truth. A possible way to do so without having to resort to artificial
mock crime procedures would be to require participants to wear a
video-recording device for a certain duration of hours over a period of
several days. Then, the researcher could verify the veracity of the
interviewees' reports in the subsequent interview (e.g., Meixner &
Rosenfeld, 2014).
3.2 | Conclusion
In sum, we showed that truthful statements could be distinguished
from fabricated ones, and that lies embedded in otherwise
truthful statements did not differ from lies embedded in deceptive
statements. We also showed that lies embedded in otherwise truthful
statements could be distinguished from truths embedded in
truthful statements. Accordingly, verbal credibility assessment tools
based on verbal content measured in this study may be robust against
the embedding of lies.
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ENDNOTE
1 An alternative analysis would be to run within-participant analyses to
compare truth – lie differences. Such analyses are methodologically
inappropriate as these comparisons potentially confound truth lie differ-
ences with duration and activity; specifically, the critical period spanned
two hours, whereas a morning and evening can describe a more variable
period, and will likely describe different activities.
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